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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MYRNA FABRIZIO, 
Appellant 
vs. 
FIDELITY AND GUARANTY 
LIFE INSURANCE COMP ANY, 
Respondent 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 12596 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for payment of death benefits on an 
application for insurance brought by the widow of the 
deceased Delbert Fabrizio. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The respective parties all filed motions for summary 
judgment and the court denied plaintiff's motion for sum-
mary judgment and granted judgment for the defendant. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have her motion for summary judg-
ment granted or in the alternative that the matter be sent 
back for trial. 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
June 27, 1967, Delbert Fabrizio, his wife the Plaintiff, 
Myrna Fabrizio, and his mother and father met in the of-
fice of the First Security Bank of Utah, Roosevelt Office, 
with Paul Murphy, the manager of the bank. Delbert Fab-
rizio and Plaintiff were delinquent on a loan with the bank 
and the purpose of the meeting was to re-negotiate a new 
loan and to borrow additional money. The mother and fa-
ther of Delbert Fabrizio were present because the bank 
required additional security and they were deeding to their 
son land for such security. 
When the Loan had been completed Mr. Murphy, the 
bank manager, then urged that credit life insurance be ob-
tained to protect the payment of the loan. The Plaintiff and 
her husband had complete confidence and trust in Mr. 
Murphy and his recommendations and agreed to discuss life 
insurance. 
Mr. Murphy was at the time also an officer and stock-
holder in the Central Utah Insurance Agency and had a 
financial interest in the success of the company. The bank 
refers as much business as it can to the Central Utah Insur-
ance Agency. A Mr. Gale Holt was called on the phone by 
Mr. Murphy and he came to the bank. He explained insur-
ance policies that could be purchased through the Central 
Utah Insurance Agency but which would be issued by the 
• 
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Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company. An application 
for insurance was completed with the Plaintiff, Myrna 
Fabrizio, as the beneficiary with the bank's interest being 
paid first in case of death. 
Delbert Fabrizio did not have at this time the money 
to pay the premium so the agent agreed to mail in the ap-
plication and advance the premium with the understanding 
he would be repaid out of the loan proceeds from the bank. 
This was done and the application was received by the Fi-
delity and Guaranty Insurance Company on June 29, 1967. 
The agent explained to Delbert Fabrizio, the deceased, 
that a medical examination would be required and the agent 
arranged for the examination with the doctors at the Roose-
velt Hospital. 
The Plaintiff and her mother and father-in-law under-
stood the insurance was in force as of that date. (See Depo-
sition of each). 
The medical examination was given June 30, 1967 by 
Dr. Buxton and the report was received by the Fidelity and 
Guaranty Insurance Company July 5, 1967. 
July 12, 1967 the agent, Gale Holt, received a letter 
dated July 7, 1967, from the insurance company which in-
dicated that a blood pressure recheck was necessary or 
Fabrizio could only be considered at a minimum of the 
Table H Rate. (Exhibit No. 6). 
The agent wrote to Fabrizio informing him there was 
a probable high blood pressure and that the insurance would 
cost more money and for him to come to the office and go 
over the life insurance program. (See Exhibit No. 3). The 
agent did not hear from Fabrizio and wrote other letters 
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and attempted to contact him by phone but failed to do so. 
About the 7th day of September, 1967, the agent received 
from the Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company a letter 
stating the case had been filed incomplete and the initial 
payment of $75.50 was enclosed with instructions to deliver 
the check to the deceased. 
On September 9, 1967, Gale Holt and Delbert Fabrizio 
met on the streets of Roosevelt, Utah and went to the off ice 
of the agent where they discussed the insurance policy and 
the blood pressure recheck. The agent informed the de-
ceased the additional premium was only necessary if there 
was high blood pressure and that the money would be re-
funded if there was no high blood pressure. (See Deposition 
of Gale Holt Pages 35 and 81-82). 
The type of policy available under the rated insurance 
program was discussed and agreed upon with an additional 
premium of $150.50 being due. Fabrizio again did not have 
the premium payment and the agent agreed to advance to 
him the premium and the offer was accepted. 
Monday, September 11, 1967 Gale Holt phoned the Salt 
Lake City office of the defendant insurance company and 
was advised to mail in the two checks. The original premium 
of $75.50 and the second premium of $150.50 were then for-
warded by the agent to the office of Fidelity and Guaranty 
Insurance Company by letter. 
The agent also requested the office let him know what 
else "He should do to keep things going." (See Exhibit 
#16) 
On Tuesday, September 12th, 1967, the agent again 
wrote to the Salt Lake office of Fidelity and Guaranty In-
surance Company and stated, "In our phone call you advised 
me to forward the two checks, one for $75.50 and $150.50 
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to make a total of $226.00 as the annual premium for a term 
policy. Let me know if you need more information on this 
pending item. (See Exhibit# 17). 
Fabrizio was accidently killed September 12th, 1967, 
as he was attempting to unload logs from a truck. The 
father of the deceased came to the agent's office about 4 :15 
P. M. the same day and gave the agent this information. 
This was the first Mr. Holt knew of the death of Mr. Fab-
rizio. 
Charles L. Soelberg, the supervisor of life operation for 
Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company, learned Wed-
nesday, September 13th, 1967, on his car radio while going 
to work that Fabrizio had been killed. The two premium 
checks were received in his office that same day. 
On September 14th, 1967, the father of Delbert Fab-
rizio paid the agent, Gale Holt, $150.00 which the deceased 
owed to the agent for money advanced by the agent. 
The insurance company tendered back both insurance 
premiums about October 18th, 1967 and refused to issue a 
policy of life insurance or to pay the insurance applied for. 
MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES 
POINT I 
AMBIGUITIES IN INSURANCE POLICIES AND 
BINDERS ARE TO BE CONSTRUED MOST FAVOR-
ABLY TOW ARD THE INSURED AND AGAINST THE 
INSURER. 
The rule of law recognized by generally all jurisdictions 
(See Seventh Dicennial Digest, Vol. 17, Insurance, Section 
146.7 (1) pp 1296-1309) is that insurance contracts and 
conditional receipts are not ordinary contracts but are con-
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tracts of adhesion between parties not equally situated and 
having been prepared unilaterally by the insurer, the terms 
are to be strictly construed against the insurer and the 
interpretation most favorable to the insured is to be chosen. 
Allen v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 208 A. 2d 
638 (N. J. 1965). 
That Utah is consistent with this rule see Jorgensen v. 
Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 13 Utah 3d 303 (1962); 
Stout v. Washington Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 
14 Utah 2d 414 (1963); P. E. Ashton v. Joyner, 17 Utah 2d 
162 (1965); Christensen v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
21Utah2d 194 (1968). 
POINT II 
CONDITIONS STATED IN THE APPLICATION 
AND THE CONDITIONAL RECEIPT MUST BE CON-
SIDERED TOGETHER AND IF THEY ARE AMBIGU-
OUS MUST BE CONSTRUED MOST FAVORABLY TO-
W ARD THE INSURED. 
The recent case of Machinery Center, Inc., v. Anchor 
Nati01wl Life Insurance Company, 434 F. 2d 1 (10 Cir 
1970), which originated in Utah states: 
"A binding receipt and the application for insur-
ance are to be construed together .... " 
The pertinent language from the application states: 
"I agree that no insurance shall take effect unless 
and until the policy has been delivered and received 
and accepted by me and the first premipm paid dur-
ing the life of the Proposed Insured and while his 
state of health is as stated in the application except 
as provided in the Conditional Receipt bearing the 
same number as this application if a premium has 
been paid as indicated in Item #21 above and such 
Receipt issued." 
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The conditional receipt attached to the Exhibit states 
the following conditions are to be met before the insurance 
is in effect: 
" ... Issuance of this receipt does not place any in-
surance in effect for any period unless the proposed 
insured was insurable and acceptable as provided 
below. 
"Insurance under the terms of this policy applied 
and accepted by me and the first premium paid dur-
and supplementary provisions if applied for and 
take effect as of the last of any medical examination 
or tests required under the rules and practices of 
the company or the date of this payment, which 
ever shall be the later, provided that on the date the 
proposed insured, in the opinion of the company's 
authorized officer at its home office, was insurable 
and acceptable under the rules and practices of the 
company as a standard risk for the policy and/or 
supplementary provision in the amount, on the plan 
and otherwise exactly as applied for, otherwise there 
shall be no liability on the part of the company ex-
cept to return this payment in the form of the com-
pany's check. 
The conditional receipt, Exhibit No. 19, which was also 
given to the proposed insured, is worded differently but 
contains about the same requirements as the conditional 
receipt in Exhibit No. 2. 
The application contained the following requirements: 
1. Delivery and receipt of the policy by Fabrizio 
2. Acceptance by Fabrizio 
3. During Fabrizio's lifetime 
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The conditional receipt imposes these requirements: 
1. Completion of medical examinations or tests re-
quired under the rules and practices of the com-
pany. 
2. Payment of the premium. 
3. Determination that Fabrizio was insurable and 
acceptable under all rules and practices of the com-
pany as a standard risk for the policy and amount 
exactly as applied for. 
The defendant specifically urges that all these condi-
tions must be met before insurance can take effect. A closer 
examination of the language on the application reveals that 
all the requirements in the application are excepted (" ... 
except as provided in the conditional receipt ... "). Similar 
language in an application was held to be modified by the 
language of the conditional receipt in the case of Liberty 
Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 175 So. 2d 737 (Ala. 1965). 
The plaintiff urges that only the conditions of the con-
ditional receipt are to be met where the applicant has paid 
the premium and received a conditional receipt in advance 
of the company issuing a policy. 
A fact that the plaintiff and the defendant can each 
interpret the language to mean differently indicates there 
is an ambiguity and the ambiguity should be resolved in 
favor of the insured. 
In Gaunt v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 160 F. 
2d 599 the court declared that language in an insurance 
contract should be construed as it would be understood by 
the ordinary applicant for insurance. 
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In the recent California case of Young v. Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Co., 77 Cal. Rptr. 382 the court found that 
insurance contracts were ones of adhesion between parties 
not equally situated and it was thus incumbent upon the in-
surer as the dominant and expert party in the field to not 
only draft such contracts in unambiguous terms but also to 
bring to the attention of the prospective insured all provi-
sions and conditions which create exceptions or limitations 
on the coverage. This principle is particularly relevant 
where conditional receipts are concerned because the very 
acceptance of an advance premium by the agent tends nat-
urally toward an understanding of the immediate coverage 
though it be temporarily and terminable. In short, to the 
ordinary laymen, payment of the insurance premium con-
stitutes payment for immediate protection and it is unlikely 
that one would carefully read the fine print contained in a 
receipt. 
In the case of Liberty National Life Insurance Co. v. 
Hamilton, 237 F. 2d 235 (6 Cir) found: 
"A Binding Receipt which recited that if medical 
examination was required then insurance shall take 
effect on the date of completion of the examination 
and in no event shall issuance of such receipt cause 
the company to be liable in excess of One Hundred 
Thousand ($100,000.00) Dollars and said ~eceipt 
also recited that insurance was not to be considered 
in force until policy was issued, receipt was ambig-
uous and was construed to provide a contract for 
interim insurance." 
Therefore, the conditions that the insured must meet 
are those imposed by the conditional receipt i.e. payment of 
premium, medical examination, and insurability on the date 
of the application or examination. 
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POINT III 
AMBIGUITY EXISTS AS TO WHAT IS MEANT BY 
THE TERM "THE LAST OF ANY MEDICAL EXAMIN-
ATIONS OR TESTS". 
The defendant has stated in its memorandums sub-
mitted to the lower court that the decedent, Fabrizio, did 
not submit to all the medical examinations or tests required 
by the company. Agent Gale Holt in his deposition indicates 
that a medical examination with attendant physician was 
not required or necessary. Beginning on page 35 of his dep-
osition at line 13 the agent recounts a conversation as fol-
lows: 
" ... all he had to do was to go to the doctor and get 
a blood pressure check. It was not necessary to get 
an appointment, one of the girls could do that." 
At page 89, line 1 of the agent's deposition he stated 
as follows: 
" ... probably only take you five or ten minutes to 
do it and you don't even need an appointment. You 
can go up there and one of the girls can put that on 
your arm and you can take the check." 
It is obvious that the insured and the agent both un-
derstood that an examination by a licensed physician or 
other licensed personnel was not required. Anyone at the 
hospital could give the examination. Medical examinations 
or medical tests are typically performed by doctors or per-
sons licensed by the State of Utah, not just "one of the 
girls". 
In Prince v. Western Empire Life Ins. Co., 19 U. 2d 
174 (1967), a Dr. Prince had completed two medical exam-
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inations but was killed before further medical information 
requested by the insurer was obtained. This court held that 
ambiguity existed as to the meaning of 
" ... the date of medical examination as stated on 
the back of the binding receipt." 
In requiring further information in the Prince case, 
the insurer appeared to be trying to provide the best rate 
possible considering the medical condition of Dr. Prince and 
not for the purpose of rejection. In the instant case. Fab-
rizio had completed a medical examination, the company 
was well aware of his medical condition and the additional 
tests required by the insurer was not for the purpose of de-
termining insurability, but for the purpose of presenting 
Fabrizio with insurance at the best premium rate possible 
consistent with his medical condition. 
After the insured and the agent met on the 9th of Sep-
tember and the insured had selected a different policy and 
paid the premium the agent wrote a letter and indicated 
that he had collected the additional premium said: 
"Let me know what I should do to keep this thing 
going as we want a policy issued as soon as possi-
ble." (Exhibit # 16) 
The next day the agent wrote again to the Salt Lake 
City Office of the defendant insurance company in which 
he informed the company he was forwarding two checks 
as he had been advised and he again requested additional in-
formation as to what he should do and asked if more infor-
mation is needed by the company. (Exhibit # 17) 
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From the above it is amply clear that the agent him-
self did not believe any medical examination was required 
but that only a blood pressure re-check was necessary to 
determine the rate that would be charged. 
POINT IV 
INSURANCE BECOMES EFFECTIVE ON THE 
DATE OF APPLICATION OR MEDICAL EXAMINA-
TION IF THE INSURED WAS INSURABLE. 
The court stated in Prince v. Western Empire Life 
Ins. Co. supra at 179, 
"We think that the binding receipt became effective 
upon completion of the medical examination ... un-
less at that time the applicant was not an insurable 
risk." 
" ... A statement of the trend of the more recent de-
cisions is found in 29 Am. Jur., Insurance, Section 
210" 
The court in Thorpe v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 286 F. 
Supp. 620 (N. D. Ind. 1968) at 626 states: 
"Regardless, then, of whether or not any examina-
tion is ever taken, if it can be shown that the appli-
cant was insurable, the company should not be heard 
to say that failure to take a medical examination (or 
consequently, the failure to provide proof of insur-
ability) bars recovery ... We think that to find that 
insurance is in full force and effect from the time 
the receipt is issued and the premium paid, if the 
applicant is found to be insurable in connection with 
objective company standards, is the only result 
which does substantial justice both to the applicant 
and to the insured. 
Under the rule adopted by the Utah Court in Prince, 
if the applicant was insurable on the date of the examina-
tion or application the applicant is insured. 
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To not allow the insured this protection would be to 
permit the insurer the unconsciouable act of receiving con-
sideration and not having to perform. In Western & South-
ern Life Ins. v. Vale, 12 N.E. 350 at 353, 354 we find the 
following: 
"In Starr v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 1905, 41 Wash, 
228, 232, 83 P. 116, 117, it is pointed out that, if the 
company has the right to arbitrarily reject the ap-
plication in ~he event of death of the applicant be-
fore the policy is issued, no benefit is derived from 
that portion of the premium which covers the time 
between the application and the acceptance and is-
suance of the policy. This is undoubtedly true, since, 
if the company is not bound to pay a loss occurring 
in the period, there is no insurance for the period. It 
is said, 'The chief object of the provision would, 
therefore, seem to be to enable the insurance com-
pany to collect premiums for a period during which 
there was in fact no insurance and consequently no 
risk.' 
... In other words, it is recognized that such a re-
ceipt is calculated to convey the impression to the 
applicant for insurance that he is insured, and to 
procure money from him as premium for insurance 
over a period when he is not insured at all". 
The Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lamme, 425 p. 
346, the court stated: 
"Nor should a court be obliged to overlook the ob-
vious advantage to the company in obtaining pay-
ment of the premium when the application is made. 
It is a device to avoid the possibility that the appli-
cant will change his mind and revoke his application, 
or deal with a rival company. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co. v. Grant, 268 F 2nd 307 (9 Cir. 1959) "A con-
ditional receipt tends to encourage deception. We do 
not mean to imply affirmative misconduct by the 
soliciting agent. We suggest only that if nothing is 
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said about the complicated and legalistic phrasing of 
the receipt, and the agent accepts an application for 
insuranc~ together with the first premium payment, 
the applicant has reason to believe he is insured. 
Otherwise, he is deceived." 
In this case, the court held that a medical examination 
was not necessary as long as the applicant was insurable. 
POINT V 
FABRIZIO WAS INSURABLE AND ACCEPT ABLE 
UNDER THE RULES AND PRACTICES OF THE COM-
PANY AS A STANDARD RISK FOR THE POLICY AND/ 
OR SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISION IN THE AMOUNT, 
ON THE PLAN AND OTHERWISE EXACTLY AS AP-
PLIED FOR. 
The condition that the applicant be insurable and ac-
ceptable under the rules and practices of the company as a 
standard risk for the policy and/or supplementary provi-
sion in the amount, on the plan and otherwise exactly as 
applied for is vague and ambiguous and must be construed 
most favorable to the insured. (See points I and II above) 
Further Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co., supra, 
page 601 the court stated: 
"An underwriter might so understand the phrase, 
when read in its context, but the application was not 
to be submitted to the underwriter; it was to go to 
persons utterly unacquainted with the niceties of 
life insurance who would read it colloquially. It is 
the understanding of such persons that counts .... " 
It is well to ask what is meant by the term "standard 
risk"? Does it mean as applied to the whole assortment of 
policies the company offers for sale? Does it only apply 
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to a policy or to the policy and amount? And what is the 
meaning of the phrase "exactly as applied for"? Fabrizio 
was the standard risk for the policy and amount for which 
he applied and is included within the definition. 
If Fabrizio is not included because the term "standard 
risk" is narrowly construed, it must then be held that the 
insurer is estopped from relying on this construction or 
that it has waived the "standard risk" when they, knowing 
at all times of Fabrizio's medical condition: 
1. Offered Fabrizio a choice of three different pol-
icies. 
2. Accepted payment for a rated policy. 
3. Did not request additional medical examinations 
for the new policy. 
Beginning at the top of Page (35) of the deposition of 
Gale Holt we read as follows: 
"If I pay the $150.00 he says, 'I have still got to 
pay that even if my blood pressure goes up?" And I 
said, "That's right," and then he indicated that "if I 
don't have high blood pressure then I can get my 
money refunded," and I said, that's right." 
It is clear that this was the understanding of the agent, 
Gale Holt and the insured Delbert Fabrizio. It is also clear 
' from the deposition of agent Holt that this was the under-
standing of Soelberg who supervised the life operations of 
the defendant company. 
Agent Holt, in his deposition states that he called Mr. 
Soelberg on the phone and asked him to explain to him the 
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basic rate for the three types of policies that were being 
offered. Beginning at Page (47) Line (20) the questions 
and answers of Mr. Gale Holt in the deposition are as fol-
lows: 
Q "Did he tell you that if the additional money was 
paid a policy would be issued in any event?" 
A "He did not tell me that, no. He told me that this 
money would have to be paid if he had high 
blood pressure." 
Q "Did he give you any assurance that the com-
pany would accept Delbert Fabrizio in any 
event upon the payment of the money and a 
blood pressure re-check, or did he indicate that 
this was still to be left up to the acceptance of 
the company at the home office?" 
A "His indication was that he didn't see any other 
problem in Mr. Delbert Fabrizio's health pro-
viding that the blood pressure check was taken, 
that he would probably have the policy issued 
and that if he did have high blood pressure then 
he would have to pay the additional payment of 
$150.00 but he wanted to know if Mr. Fabrizio, 
Delbert Fabrizio, wanted the upgraded insur-
ance. He wanted to know this and to acknowl-
edge that this was the reason we tendered the 
$150.50 is because he wanted the insurance." 
Q Did Mr. Soelberg indicate that the additional 
payment would be necessary in order for them 
to continue processing it or something?" 
A "He didn't indicate that, no." 
Again on Page (81) commencing with line (18) agent 
Gale Holt stated as follows : 
"My understanding was that the $76.00 was the 
base premium. If he were in good health, this 
is what the amount would be. If he had high 
blood pressure and the company would accept 
him then they would charge this additional 
amount. In other words they would write the in-
surance for this amount if he had high blood 
pressure." 
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Q And if the recheck was showed that he didn't 
have high blood pressure was he to get a refund 
on his insurance premium?" 
A He would have got a refund on the $150.00. 
The letter from the home office of the defendant in-
surance company to the Salt Lake City office, which letter 
was then forwarded to the agent Gale Holt (Exhibit No. 
11) shows that the applicant was an acceptable risk and 
insurable under the rules and practices of the company for 
the policy which Fabrizio applied for. 
POINT VI 
THE DEFENDANT FIDELITY AND GUARANTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY MADE A NEW OFFER OR IN-
SURANCE TO THE DECEASED WHICH WAS AC-
CEPTED. 
If the court should find that the applicant, Delbert 
Fabrizio, was not insured under the policy applied for on 
June 27th then the plaintiff takes the alternative position 
that the defendant company on the 9th day of September, 
1967, offered a new insurance policy to Fabrizio which was 
accepted. 
At a meeting in the bank at Roosevelt, Utah on June 
27th, 1967, Fabrizio signed an application for insurance as 
follows: 
1. The amount of the insurance was Twenty Five 
Thousand ($25,000.00) Dollars. 
2. The policy was an executive reducing term pol-
icy for twenty (20) years. 
3. The premium for this policy was Seventy Five 
and 50/100 ($75.50) Dollars. 
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The insurance policy offered Fabrizio on September 
9th, 1967, which was accepted was as follows: 
1. A policy for twenty five (25) years. 
2. The premium was $226.00. 
A letter from the home office to Salt Lake City, Utah 
which was forwarded to the agent, Gale Holt, clearly shows 
the company was offering other policies to the deceased. 
(Exhibit No. 11). 
A letter from Gale Holt to the Salt Lake City office of 
defendant insurance company, dated September 11th, 1967, 
stated that he had collected the premium and sent it in, and 
then requests : 
"Let me know what I should do to keep this thing 
going as we want a policy issued as soon as possi-
ble." (Exhibit No. 16). 
Nothing was said about an examination or blood pres-
sure since these applied to the policy applied for in June of 
1967. 
On September 12th, 1967 agent Gale Holt again wrote 
to the defendant insurance company requesting it to let 
him know if they needed 
"-----More information on this pending item." (Ex-
hibit No. 17). 
Following this interview with Fabrizio on Saturday 
Holt talked by phone on Monday with the defendant in Salt 
Lake City, Utah and advised them he had collected the ad-
ditional premium. 
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In Exhibits (No. 16 and No. 17) he ask what else he 
should do to complete the matter so the policy could be is-
sued. 
QUERY: If an examination was needed for the second 
policy why did Gale Holt both phone and write the defen-
dant company asking what else was necessary. Why was he 
not informed that a medical examination would be required 
with the second insurance policy, and why did he not so 
inform Fabrizio? 
The answer is that the company knew of the medical 
condition of Fabrizio and they were willing to accept him 
on the rated premium. 
POINT VII 
THE CONDITIONAL RECEIPT IS AN INSURABIL-
ITY TYPE RECEIPT. 
The annotation reported at 8 ALR 2d, 943, discusses 
the question of conditional receipts. 
From a study of this annotation and the wording of 
the conditional receipt in the present case it appears rather 
clearly that the conditional receipt here is of the "insurabil-
ity" type. 
The conditional receipt in the present case is similar to 
the one in the Prince Case and there the court held the 
conditional receipt to be a binding receipt or an "insurabil-
ity" type and held in favor of the deceased insured. 
The case of Machinery Inc. v. Anchor National Life In-
surance Company, 434 F 2d and relied on by the defendant 
in the lower court is not controlling because there the con-
ditional receipt was found to be of the "approval" type. 
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POINT VII 
THE MOFRAD AND KILLPACK CASES ARE NOT 
CONTROLLING. 
The cases of Mofrad v. New York Ins. Co, 206 F 2d 
491 (10 Cir. 1953) and Killpack v. National Old Line Ins. 
Co., 229 F 2d 851 (10 Cir. 1956) both suffer from the same 
disability. They are both cases that originated in the Feder-
al District Court of Utah and went up on appeal to the 
Tenth Circuit. As such, they can only rule what they be-
lieve the law to be. They cannot declare it. It is for the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah to declare what the 
law is for the State of Utah. It should also be noted that 
while both Mofrad and Killpack arise in Utah, the Federal 
Court relies on the law of other jurisdictions to apply. 
Therefore these two cases should not be recognized with the 
same persuasive authority as those cases determined by the 
state supreme court i.e. as of the same persuasiveness as 
Prince. 
CONCLUSION 
The deposition of agent Holt is contradictory in many 
respects but a reading of the entire deposition and taking it 
as a whole together with the other depositions it is abun-
dantly clear : 
1. That Fabrizio thought he was insured as did all 
members of his family. 
2. That the application and conditional receipt are 
ambiguous. 
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3. That Fabrizio met the conditions he was re-
quired to meet and was insurable at the time 
of his death. 
4. That the blood pressure recheck was to estab-
lish premium rates and not insurability. 
5. That had Fabrizio not been accidentally killed 
the defendant insurance company would have 
issued an insurance policy. 
For the reasons herein stated, plaintiff submits that 
her motion for summary Judgment should have been 
granted and that the trial corut's order granting defen-
dant's motion for summary Judgment should be reversed, 
or in the alternative the plaintiff should be granted a right 
to trial on the issues. 
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